Previous papers by Eric B. Rasmusen et. al. (1991) and Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston (2000) argue that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry in the presence of scale economies and multiple buyers. We first show that these results no longer hold when buyers are final consumers who can renegotiate these contracts or breach them and pay expectation damages. We then show, however, that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry if buyers are downstream competitors, even in the absence of scale economies and even if breach or renegotiation is possible.
Introduction
Whether or not an incumbent firm can profitably use an exclusive contract to inefficiently deter entry is an important issue in competition policy and in many antitrust cases, such as the antitrust actions brought against Microsoft. 1 While United States antitrust law currently treats exclusive contracts under a rule of reason standard in which economic efficiencies are balanced against possible anticompetitive harm, "Chicago School" scholars (Richard Posner (1976, p. 212 ) and Robert Bork (1978, p. 309) ) contend that antitrust law should treat exclusive contracts as per se legal.
Focusing on buyers who are final consumers, these scholars assume that an excluding firm cannot get buyers to sign anticompetitive exclusive contracts unless it fully compensates them for the anticompetitive harm from these contracts. Given this assumption, they note that an excluding firm cannot profitably induce buyers to sign exclusive contracts since it only gains the monopoly profit from using the exclusive contracts but must pay buyers the monopoly profit plus the deadweight loss to induce them to sign the anticompetitive exclusive contracts. Based on this, they conclude that efficiency considerations, rather than anticompetitive motives, explain the use of exclusive contracts. use exclusive contracts to deter efficient entry when production exhibits scale economies. 2 While the RRW-SW model analyzes several different cases, the key feature of the model is that the entrant can only reach minimum efficient scale if some minimum number (greater than one) of buyers have rejected an exclusive contract and thus are free to buy from the entrant. Thus a buyer imposes a negative externality on other buyers when it signs an exclusive contract. In the RRW-SW model, the incumbent monopolist gets buyers to sign exclusive contracts that inefficiently deter entry by exploiting this externality.
While the RRW-SW result covers an important benchmark case, this result hinges on the as-1 United States v. Microsoft (1995 Consent Decree) concerned exclusive dealings contracts between Microsoft and personal computer manufacturers. In the 2000 case, the Department of Justice challenged Microsoft's exclusionary contracts with the 14 largest internet service providers, four online services, and many internet content providers (Whinston 2001) . 2 Other articles that challenge the "Chicago School" view include Phillippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), G. Frank Mathewson and Ralph A. Winter (1987) , Kathryn E. Spier and Whinston (1995) , B. Douglas Bernheim and Whinston (1998), Neeman (1999) and Spector (2004) . Robert Innes and Richard J. Sexton's (1994) article argues that the "Chicago School" claim that exclusive contracts are necessarily efficient can be resurrected if one allows all the players to form coalitions and price discrimination is prohibited. None of these papers consider the case where buyers compete with each other in a downstream product market.
sumption that exclusive contracts cannot be renegotiated or breached. If we relax this assumption, then exclusive contracts cannot deter entry in any subgame perfect equilibrium in which buyers are final consumers who can renegotiate the exclusive contract or breach the exclusive contract and pay expectation damages. (Expectation damages put the other party in the position it would have been in had the contract been performed (Cooter and Ulen 2004; Hatzis 2001; Shavell 1980) .) The intuition for this result is straightforward. If another supplier enters, a buyer that has signed an exclusive contract can obtain a lower price by breaching the exclusive contract. While the breaching buyer must pay the incumbent damages equal to the incumbent's loss of monopoly rent on this buyer's purchases, the buyer saves these monopoly rents plus the deadweight loss by purchasing at the lower price. Thus, a buyer who is a final consumer will breach the exclusive contracts to save the deadweight loss. Since the entrant can now make sales to this buyer, the exclusive contract does not prevent the entrant from entering since it will anticipate that enough buyers will breach so that it can reach minimum efficient scale. 3 That is, if breach or renegotiation are feasible, then economies of scale do not allow an incumbent to use exclusive contracts to deter entry.
While the effect of allowing breach or renegotiation may not be surprising, it is important for two reasons. First, while there are undoubtedly many situations where renegotiation is prohibitively costly, and reputational considerations or large legal costs may raise the cost of breach far above any damages a court might impose, the assumption that exclusive contracts cannot be renegotiated or breached seems unlikely to apply generally. Contractual provisions that prohibit renegotiation are typically not enforceable (Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 311 cmt. a 1981). Furthermore, if renegotiation is not feasible for some reason, the buyer still has the option of breaching the exclusive contract and buying from a new supplier. In such a case, the standard common law rule gives each contractual party the option of performing her contractual duties or paying expectation damages. 4 Second, the case where buyers are final consumers who can breach or renegotiate exclusive contracts serves as a useful benchmark for highlighting the main result of this paper: While allowing for breach or renegotiation may prevent exclusive contracts from inefficiently deterring entry if buyers are final consumers, this does not necessarily prevent exclusive contracts from inefficiently 3 Scott Masten and Edward Snyder (1989) and Kathryn Spier and Michael D. Whinston (1995) have raised a similar point in reference to the Aghion and Bolton model, which relies on the assumption that an incumbent monopolist and a buyer can sign a contract with liquidated damages. Dewatripont (1988) was one of the first to investigate the issue of renegotiation and entry deterrence, though he did not explicitly consider exclusive supply contracts. 4 In principle, an exclusive contract could set damages so high that breach is never profitable, but courts in common law countries would be unlikely to enforce such a penalty clause ( deterring entry if buyers are downstream competitors. Consequently, even if breach or renegotiation is possible, the Chicago School arguments do not justify making exclusive contracts per se legal since these contracts are often used where buyers compete with each other in a downstream market. 5 The intuition for this result is straightforward. If downstream competition is intense, then buyers are forced to pass along to their customers most of the benefits from obtaining a lower price.
Consequently, a buyer who breaches an exclusive contract in this environment saves substantially less than the monopoly profit plus the deadweight loss. As a result, the buyer's savings from breaching the exclusive contract are no longer sufficient to compensate the incumbent monopolist for its loss of monopoly rent on the buyer's purchases. Thus, no buyer would breach the exclusive contract where competition is sufficiently intense, and the incumbent can profitably deter entry by signing all buyers to exclusive contracts. Furthermore, this result does not depend on the presence of economies of scale in the upstream market.
This result is of particular interest because it is almost the exact opposite of the result obtained in the only other paper to analyze the effect of downstream competition in the naked exclusion model with linear prices. 6 Fumagalli and Motta (2004) argue that exclusion is not possible where downstream competition is intense because a single free buyer who obtains the input at a lower price from an entrant can expand its sales sufficiently to allow that entrant to attain minimum efficient scale. This argument, however, requires that the benefits to such a buyer from rejecting an exclusive contract exceed whatever side payment the incumbent is willing to offer for signing an exclusive contract. This requirement holds in the Fumagalli and Motta model because buyers who sign the exclusive contract (captive buyers) exit the market if there is one free buyer, thus one free buyer becomes a downstream monopolist. While this is an interesting case, we believe that it is a somewhat special case. If the downstream buyers offer somewhat differentiated products, then captive buyers could make sufficient profits to cover their fixed costs. Even if the buyers offer identical products, the incumbent could structure the exclusive contract to prevent exit. For example, it could offer to pay the fixed cost of captive buyers, or it could waive the exclusivity 5 In many of the major exclusive dealing cases, at least some of the buyers subject to the exclusive contract competed with other buyers subject to the exclusive contract. For example, in Standard Fashion Co. v. MagraneHouston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922), Standard Fashion required retailers to sell only their dress patterns. In all but the smallest communities, there would be more than one competing dress pattern retailer. Similarly, in Standard Oil Co. (Cal.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), Standard Oil required that gas stations selling their refined gasoline not sell gasoline of any other refiner. Almost all the gas stations subject to this exclusive contract must have competed with other gas stations that bought gasoline from Standard Oil. More recently, in the Microsoft case, their exclusive contracts were always offered to buyers that competed with each other. 6 In a somewhat different model, Yong (1999) finds that if an upstream incumbent can offer two part tariffs, then downstream competition allows inefficient exclusion.
requirement if there is a free buyer. Lastly, notice that since the incumbent earns zero profit if there is one free buyer, the incumbent would not suffer any damages if captive buyers breached the contract. So, rather than exit the market, the captive buyers could also breach the exclusive contract, thereby creating competition downstream. As we show in this paper, because most of the benefits from upstream competition in cases like these are passed on to final consumers, downstream competition enables an incumbent to get buyers to sign exclusive contracts by making only a small side payment.
The remainder of this paper discusses these main points in greater detail. Section 2 describes a generalized version of the RRW-SW model that allows for both renegotiation and competition among buyers. Section 3 shows why exclusive contracts have little commitment value in this model when buyers are final consumers. Section 4 shows that exclusive contracts will always commit buyers to buy from the incumbent monopolist, and therefore deter entry, when buyers are undifferentiated Bertrand competitors. Section 5 discusses the intermediate case of imperfect competition and provides an example where exclusive contracts will have commitment value when competition among buyers is intense but not when competition among buyers is slight. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
Except where necessary to incorporate breach (or renegotiation) and downstream competition, we use the same model as RRW-SW. Everything described below is common knowledge to all agents in the model, and we will focus on subgame perfect equilibria. There are two upstream producers of a homogeneous input, an incumbent (I) and a rival (R), and N downstream buyers. RRW-SW assume the buyers are final consumers. We relax this assumption so that the buyers can be downstream competitors. In period 1, I offers buyers exclusive contracts and buyers decide whether to accept or reject these contracts. An exclusive contract is a transfer from I to a buyer in exchange for the buyer's promise not to buy from any other input supplier. Following RRW-SW, we assume that the precise nature of the good that will be needed is not known until period 3, so we do not allow I to set a price for the good in this period. 7 In our model, we do not distinguish between the cases where the incumbent can discriminate between buyers. Nor do we distinguish 7 As Segal and Whinston (2000) point out, if I could set a price in period 1, it could eliminate the distortion from exclusive contracts by charging a two-part tariff with a linear price equal to marginal cost.
between the cases where the incumbent offers these contracts simultaneously or sequentially. The results apply equally to all of these cases. In period 2, R decides whether or not to enter. R only enters if it expects to make strictly positive sales and non-negative profits. Our model differs from that of RRW-SW in period 3. In particular, we divide period 3 into three stages. In 3.1, the active upstream firms name prices for free buyers (R offers a price of p r , and I offers a price p f ) and I sets its price for captive buyers 8 (p s ). In period 3.2, the captive buyers have the opportunity to become free buyers by breaching and paying expectation damages to I. 9 In period 3.3, all free buyers purchase inputs from R or I depending on whether p r < p f or vice versa. If p r = p f , buyers purchase equally from each. Captive buyers buy from I at p ≤ p s . Then downstream buyers compete in prices to sell their (possibly) differentiated output. Like RRW-SW, we allow I to set different prices for captive buyers and for free buyers. However, unlike RRW-SW, we let captive buyers become free buyers by breaching the contract and paying expectation damages. We also allow I to unilaterally lower its price to captive customers in period 3.3. We do this because, if buyers compete in downstream markets, then I's optimal response to breach by some buyers may be to lower its price to its remaining captive customers (who will certainly not object). (We could also allow R and I to both unilaterally lower the price they offer to free buyers, but this is unnecessary since, as we show below, the price to free buyers is marginal
Despite the fact that the buyers may sell differentiated output, we assume (for tractability) that they all face symmetric demand functions (this gives the buyers identical demand functions).
That is, buyer i's demand can be written as q(
where p −i is the vector of the (final) input prices offered to all other buyers and z(p −i ) represents any possible renumbering of the N − 1 other buyers. 10 In other words, demand depends on the firm's own input price and the input prices of all other buyers but does not depend on which buyers receive which input 8 We refer to buyers who have signed an exclusive contract (and have not yet breached it) as captive buyers. 9 Allowing for renegotiation rather than breach would produce similar results. The breach case is somewhat simpler because it is a unilateral decision. 10 We say that p−i represent final input prices to indicate that we are referring to the prices that the other buyers actually pay, not what they are contractually obligated to pay.
prices. We assume that every buyer's demand is strictly decreasing in the input price she must pay,
We write the profit function of each buyer as
This corresponds to the consumer surplus function, CS, in SW when buyers are final consumers or retailers who sell in distinct markets. We assume that both q and π b are weakly increasing in every element of p −i (other buyers paying a higher price does not decrease a buyer's demand or profits). 11
Following RRW-SW, we assume the upstream production technology is such that the average cost for both I and R is given by c(Q) = c for Q ≥ Q * and c 0 (Q) < 0 for all Q < Q * . We assume that demand is large enough relative to Q * to support two firms that split the market at a price equal to minimum average cost. R will enter in period 2 only if it can make nonnegative profits competing only for free buyers. However, because we allow for breach, the free buyers are downstream buyers who did not sign an exclusive contract in period 1 and downstream buyers who did sign exclusive contracts in period 1 but will breach those contracts in period 3.2. The following lemma shows that downstream competition does not change the result that the free market price, given entry, is c.
Lemma 1:
If R enters in period 2, the free market price in period 3.1 is c (that is, Min{p f , p r } = c).
Proof. First, consider the case where there is at least one free buyer in period 3.1. p f < c or p r < c obviously is not optimal. Say p f > p r > c. Then all free buyers buy from R at p r and I makes no profit selling to free buyers. Because free buyers purchase at the lower of the two prices, if I lowers p f to p r this will not change the price the free buyers pay. Therefore, if I lowers p f to p r , it does not affect the demand function from its captive buyers. So, doing this does not decrease I's profit from captive buyers and it gives I non-negative profits from free buyers. Thus,
R can make positive profits by lowering its price to p f . Thus, p r = p f . If both charge above c, then I can almost double its profit by reducing its price by an arbitrarily small amount. Thus p r = p f > c is not possible. If there are no free buyers, then R's pricing strategy only matters if some buyers breach, creating free buyers in period 3.3. In this case, since I can lower its price in period 3.3, the above analysis can be applied to this this case as well. This proves the lemma.
Q.E.D.
Because R decided to enter, we know it must expect positive sales. Because it competes in a homogenous Bertrand market with I, it cannot make positive sales if it charges a price greater than I's marginal cost. Of course, R will only enter if it can sell to enough buyers so that its output is at least Q * , otherwise, it will have average costs in excess of c and so will make no sales or make negative profits.
In the RRW-SW model, the incumbent's optimal price to a buyer who has signed an exclusive contract is arg max p (p − c)q(p), which is independent of the number of captive buyers because they assume buyers are final consumers. To cover the general case where a buyer's demand may depend on the price paid by other buyers, such as when buyers are downstream competitors, we define
Because of the buyer symmetry, the optimal monopoly price (p m ) is equal for all buyers. 12 More generally, say the first n buyers are subject to an exclusive contract, 13 we define
is a n dimensional vector of the input prices for the n buyers subject to an exclusive contract. The term (p −i (n), c N−n ) is an N −1 dimensional vector of the input prices for all buyers other than i. This vector has two components:
is an n − 1 dimensional vector of the prices faced by n − 1 other buyers subject to an exclusive contract and c N−n is an N − n − 1 dimensional vector where every element is c (the prices faced by the buyers not subject to an exclusive). Thus, p m (n) is the optimal monopoly input price vector for the n buyers subject to an exclusive when the remaining buyers pay an input price of c, and
Because the market is large enough to support two firms when all buyers are free, there is an integer N * such that R enters if and only if it believes that no more than N * buyers will remain bound by an exclusive contract to purchase only from I. Because R and I will split the free market, this critical value is implicitly given by
m where dye represents the smallest integer greater than or equal to y and where (p m (N * ), c N−N * −1 ) is the 12 This is the analogue of p m from RRW-SW (which is arg maxp(p − c)q(p)). Note, however, that these definitions are only identical when either all buyers face a monopoly input supplier (i.e., R has not entered or all buyers are captive) or input demand is only a function of one's own price (buyers are final consumers or operate in completely distinct downstream markets).
13 RRW-SW use S for the number of buyers who sign an exclusive; our n is their S if all buyers who sign an exclusive abide by this contract.
14 When buyers compete with each other in the downstream market, the demand function, q, that we have used is necessarily a reduced form demand function. That is, it assumes the equilibrium downstream prices chosen by buyers in the downstream market given the buyers input prices.
N − 1 dimensional vector of the input prices paid by the other buyers, N * of whom are subject to an exclusive contract and pay p m (n), the remainder each pay c.
3 No Competition: Buyer Independence (The RRW-SW Case)
In this section, we show that, when buyers are independent, exclusive contracts cannot deter entry if buyers can breach these contracts and pay expectation damages. Buyer independence means that buyer demand depends only on her price and not on the price that other buyers pay. Examples of buyer independence include buyers who are final consumers and retailers who sell in completely separate markets. Assuming buyer independence, we can adopt the following RRW-SW notation:
Proposition 1:
When buyers are independent and can breach exclusive contracts subject only to expectation damages in period 3.2, then in any subgame perfect equilibrium entry occurs and all buyers pay a price of c, even if N * = 0 (all N buyers must be free buyers for R to enter).
Proof. Because I sets its prices after R makes its entry decision, I's prices do not affect the entry decision. Moreover, since I receives the same profit from any given buyer whether that buyer breaches or not (this is just the definition of expectation damages) and since the buyers are independent, I chooses its price to captive buyers to maximize its profit from that buyer when that buyer does not breach the contract. Therefore, I will charge p m to captive buyers. Now, consider the subgame after n buyers have signed an exclusive contract in period 1 and R enters in period 2. Say buyer i has signed an exclusive contract. If buyer i breaches this contract, then it owes expectation damages of π m , the amount necessary to put I in the position it would be in if buyer i had not breached. 15 Because R has entered, however, if buyer i breaches, then it gains x * from buying at the free market price of c rather than p m . Because there is dead weight loss from monopoly, x * > π m . Thus, buyer i gains by breaching the contract and paying expectation damages. Given that every buyer that signed an exclusive contract in period 1 will breach that 15 For simplicity, we assume a court can calculate π m perfectly. Since everyone is risk neutral, however, the results are still valid whenever the mean value of expectation damages is π m .
contract in period 3.2, the free market in period 3.3 consists of N buyers. Thus, R will enter in period 2, and all buyers will pay a price of c. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 shows that the RRW-SW result that an incumbent monopolist can use exclusive contracts to deter entry when buyers are final consumers does not hold when buyers can breach the exclusive contracts and pay expectation damages (alternatively, allowing renegotiation achieves the same result). Because the exclusive contract creates ex post dead weight loss to the parties of the exclusive contract, R knows it will be breached. 16 As a result, no matter how many buyers have signed exclusive contracts in period 1, R expects to be able to compete for the entire market in period 3, and thus attain minimum efficient scale. (Of course, given this result, we would not expect the incumbent to offer an exclusive contract that any buyers would accept in equilibrium.)
Notice that this result holds whether or not I can discriminate between buyers in period 1, whether or not the period 1 offers are sequential or simultaneous, and whether or not buyers can coordinate.
All that matters is that once entry has occurred, there is positive joint surplus between I and a buyer when a buyer opts out of an exclusive contract. This is just an application of the standard result that expectation damages facilitate efficient breach (efficient, at least, with respect to the bilateral relationship between the buyer and the incumbent). 17 Of course, we have assumed that the court can perfectly calculate expectation damages. In reality, the court may not be able to perfectly predict π m . If the court tries to estimate π m , then the proof remains valid so long as the buyers do not believe that the court will overestimate expectation damages so much that they will exceed x * . That is, the assumption of perfect estimation of damages does not drive the result, but the result does require that the court does not substantially overestimate expectation damages. 16 The situation is a little more complicated if we assume that buyers have unit demands with unobservable willingness to pay. Whether buyers with a low willingness to pay will breach depends crucially on what level of damages the court will assess for breach. A perfectly informed court would assess damages of zero since these buyers would not have bought from I even if they had not breached. But, this may not be a realistic assumption. That said, it is a little odd to think of an incumbent paying people to sign an exclusive contract who then may not buy the good at all. 17 It is also somewhat similar to a point made in Maskin and Tirole (1988) , that under complete information renegotiation undermines the ability of contracts to sustain ex post inefficient outcomes.
Perfect Competition: Buyer's Are Homogenous Bertrand Competitors
In this section, we assume that buyers are homogeneous Bertrand competitors who simply take the good supplied by an upstream firm and resell it to consumers. We assume the only expense for these buyers is the cost of the input. 18 In this case, we show that the incumbent, I, can profitably use exclusive contracts to deter entry. As in the previous section, this result does not depend on the presence or absence of scale economies. Proof. Say R has entered and there is at least one free buyer in period 3.3. We know from Lemma 1 that this buyer has marginal cost of c. Since this free buyer and the captive buyers are homogenous Bertrand competitors, captive buyers will make no sales if p s > c. Because I will make no profits from captive buyers if it sets p s > c, I sets p s = c in period 3.3. Because all buyers obtain the input at c in period 3.3, no buyer makes positive profits in period 3.3.
In period 3.2, captive buyers decide whether to breach and pay expectation damages. As . That is, a buyer's expectation damages are the total lost profit of the incumbent that results from breach, not just the profit lost from sales to that one buyer. Thus, expectation damages for breach are strictly positive if only one buyer breaches, making breach a weakly dominated strategy. 19 Given this, if all buyers sign an exclusive contract in period 1, all buyers will be captive in period 3.2. 20 18 Our argument also holds under fixed proportions. 19 Of course, the Bertrand pricing equilibrium, both upstream and downstream, does involve playing weakly dominated strategies. That said, if we used a discrete pricing space, then the proof would still go through with prices set at one penny above costs. (The incumbent would still lower prices to signers so that it would earn its one penny of profits on a larger share of the market.) 20 If more than one buyer breaches, we do not assume that expectation damages are positive. With Bertrand competition downstream, I must price at c if just one buyer breaches. Thus, having additional buyers breach does Now, consider whether buyers will sign an exclusive contract in period 1. If I offers each buyer ² > 0 to sign an exclusive contract, then each buyer will accept this offer. While a buyer earns ² in period 1 and at least zero in period 3.3 by accepting this offer, a buyer earns zero in period 1 and zero in period 3.3 if it rejects this offer.
Since all buyers accept I's offer in period 1 and will not breach the exclusive contracts in period 3.2, R does not enter. Thus, I makes positive profits in period 3.3 by getting buyers to sign exclusive contracts. Since I makes zero profit in period 3.3 if it does not sign enough buyers to prevent R from entering, every subgame perfect equilibrium must involve R not entering. Q.E.D.
At this point, let us recap the last two results. In the Posner and Bork analysis, buyers are final consumers, and sellers realize no production scale economies. In this environment, each buyer is willing to pay more to obtain entry than an incumbent monopolist is wiling to pay to prevent entry. Consequently, a monopolist cannot profitably use exclusive dealing contracts to deter entry in this environment. RRW-SW change this environment by assuming that sellers realize production economies of scale. Given this new environment, RRW-SW show that an incumbent monopolist can sometimes get buyers to sign exclusive contracts that would deter entry if they were not breached. However, in deciding whether or not to breach these contracts, each buyer will face a similar situation to that faced in the Posner and Bork environment. The benefit from breaching the contract, the monopoly rent plus the deadweight loss, exceeds the expectation damages that it must pay the monopolist, the monopoly rent. Thus, in this environment, exclusion is only profitable if there is some reason the buyers cannot breach the exclusive contracts.
If buyers are Bertrand competitors, this result changes. If one buyer becomes a free buyer by breaching the exclusive contract, Bertrand competition between the upstream incumbent and the upstream rival ensures that all buyers get the input at cost. Bertrand competition between the downstream buyers then ensures that final consumers get the downstream product at cost. Thus, all of the benefits that a buyer would get from breaching an exclusive contract are passed on to final consumers in the form of lower prices. Given this, a buyer that breaches an exclusive contract cannot earn enough profit to cover the expectation damages it would owe if it breached. In this not change I's profits. Since the breach decision of no single buyer affects the incumbent's profits, it is possible that no single buyer would owe the incumbent positive expectation damages (whether the incumbent lowers its price in period 3.3 or not) if more than one buyer breached. That said, breach is still a weakly dominated strategy. Of course, it is also possible that the incumbent could sue all the breaching buyers collectively and collect positive damages. Our proof is valid in either circumstance. It only relies on the fact that expectation damages are positive if there is one buyer who breaches.
case, a buyer has no incentive to breach the exclusive contract. 21 This result turns the Posner and Bork analysis on its head. In the Posner and Bork analysis, the incumbent monopolist cannot use exclusive contracts to deter entry because upstream competition maximizes the joint surplus of the incumbent and the buyers. In contrast, when buyers are homogenous Bertrand competitors, an upstream monopoly maximizes the joint surplus of the incumbent and the buyers (though, not total surplus), since downstream competition forces the buyers to pass on the benefits of upstream competition to final consumers. Consequently, an incumbent can increase the joint surplus of itself and its buyers by monopolizing the upstream market through the use of exclusive contracts. Specifically, the incumbent uses exclusive contracts to implement a two part tariff, in which a negative fixed fee (of ²) allocates some of this surplus to the buyers. 22 Of course, because upstream competition does maximize total surplus (including the surplus of the final consumers who are not a party to the exclusive contracts), exclusive contracts are always inefficient in this model. 23 The magnitude of this inefficiency is exactly the magnitude of the deadweight loss triangle generated when monopoly replaces competition.
Imperfect Competition: Buyer's are Differentiated Bertrand Competitors
The preceding two sections considered two polar cases. When buyers are independent an incumbent monopolist cannot use exclusive contracts to deter entry; when buyers are perfect competitors, exclusive contracts can always deter entry. These results suggest that there may be some threshold level of downstream competition below which exclusive contracts cannot deter entry and above which they can deter entry. While we cannot prove that this is true for all possible demand functions since the profit functions for the incumbent, captive buyers, and free buyers all depend on the demand function for the buyers' final output, we can provide an example where such a 21 In contrast to the Segal and Whinston (2000) model, exclusion still succeeds in our model even if downstream buyers can coordinate their response to the incumbent's offer of exclusive contracts. Given downstream competition, buyers have no incentive to reject the incumbent's exclusive contracts and thereby induce entry because all the benefits will be passed on to final consumers. 22 We thank Patrick DeGraba for suggesting this two part tariff interpretation. 23 This result is in contrast to that of Mathewson and Winter (1987) , who find that exclusive contracts may arise when they are either efficient or inefficient. There are two reasons for why their results differ. First, in their model the upstream suppliers sell differentiated products, thus there is some upstream market power absent exclusive contracts. Second, both suppliers are are initially present, so they can compete to offer exclusive contracts, whereas in our model only the incumbent can offer exclusive contracts. See Daniel P. O'Brien and Greg Shaffer (1997) for analysis of a model similar to that of Mathewson and Winter but with non-linear supply contracts.
threshold exists. Moreover, in this example, this threshold is independent of R's minimum efficient scale. While this does not prove that minimum efficient scale never affects the ability of exclusive contracts to deter entry, it does show that it is not generally true that the greater the entrant's minimum efficient scale, the less downstream competition that is needed for exclusive contracts to be able to deter entry.
Before proceeding to the example, let us analyze a buyer's breach decision in period 3.2. Let π I (n; z) be I's subgame perfect equilibrium profit in period 3 where n is the number of buyers that remain subject to an exclusive contract after R has entered, and let z be a parameter of the final demand curve that measures the product differentiation of the buyers' output (where larger values of z mean the products are closer substitutes, i.e., downstream competition is more intense). 24 Similarly, let π s (n; z) and π f (n; z) be the subgame perfect equilibrium profit of captive buyers and free buyers (given entry by R) respectively given the number of captive buyers and the product differentiation parameter. With these definitions, it is clear that n exclusive contracts are breach proof only if:
The left hand side is the joint surplus of I and buyer i when i does not breach the exclusive contract (and neither do any other buyers). The right hand side is the joint surplus of I and buyer i when i alone breaches the exclusive contract and becomes a free buyer. Again, recall that we are saying that if one buyer breaches, his damages are the total lost profit of the incumbent (π I (n; z) − π I (n − 1; z)), not just the profit lost from sales to that one buyer. If this condition does not hold, then at least one buyer will breach its exclusive agreement with I if R enters in period 2 because it can pay expectation damages to I and still be better off. This condition is also sufficient to establish that there exists an equilibrium of the subgame after R has entered in which n exclusive contracts are breach proof. There could be, however, other equilibria in which more than one buyer breaches the exclusive if π I (n 0 ; z) + π s (n 0 ; z) − π I (n 0 − 1; z) − π f (n 0 − 1; z) < 0 for some n 0 < n. 25 From here on, we will consider the case most favorable for exclusive contracts where (1) is sufficient as well as necessary for n exclusives to be breach proof.
To determine whether there is a critical level of downstream competition such that exclusive contracts can deter entry if and only if the downstream market is at least that competitive, we use the following condition (which we call the Monotone Competition Effect).
Monotone Competition Effect (MCE)-There exists a z * > 0 such that π I (n; z 0 ) + π s (n; z 0 ) −
If MCE holds, then the incumbent can use exclusive contracts to deter entry if and only if downstream competition is intense enough (downstream products are not too differentiated). It is in this sense that we say that more downstream competition always makes it "easier" for exclusive contracts to deter entry. 26
To determine whether upstream scale economies affect the incumbent's ability to use exclusive contracts to deter entry, we define the following condition. MES-Irrelevance-If there exists an
If MES-Irrelevance holds, then minimum efficient scale will not affect the ability of exclusive contracts to deter entry. This follows because whenever I can sign n 0 firms to an exclusive and have them all remain subject to this exclusive even if R enters, then I can sustain an N firm exclusive Recall that in the prior sections, the rival's minimum efficient scale did not affect whether exclusive contracts could deter entry or not. Analyzing these two polar cases using MES-Irrelevance shows why. When buyers are final consumers, π I (n; z) + π s (n; z) − π I (n − 1; z) − π f (n − 1; z) < 0 for all n (this is why buyers would always breach an exclusive contract), hence MES-Irrelevance holds. If buyers are Bertrand competitors, then we showed that if all buyers signed an exclusive contract, then it was not in a buyer's interest to breach, assuming no other buyer breached. This
The following proposition shows that there exists a downstream demand function with imperfect substitutes where both MES-Irrelevance and MCE hold.
Proposition 3:
If downstream demand is given by q i = 1 − P i + z P N j=1 (P j − P i ), where P i represents the price that downstream firm i charges to final consumers (as opposed to p i which is its input price), then both MES-Irrelevance and MCE hold.
Proof. See Appendix.
While Proposition 3 certainly does not show that MES-Irrelevance and MCE hold for every demand function, it does demonstrate that the irrelevance of minimum efficient scale is not restricted to the two polar cases considered in the prior sections. That is, minimum efficient scale need not affect the incumbent's ability to deter entry even when the downstream market is characterized by oligopoly. Moreover, at least for this demand function, there is some minimum level downstream competition (or, more precisely, product substitutability), independent of minimum efficient scale, for which exclusive contracts can effectively deter entry. Figures 1 and 2 give the minimum cross-elasticity of demand in this linear demand model that is necessary for exclusive contracts to deter entry as a function of the number of downstream firms.
Also, note that if the downstream market is competitive enough that exclusive contracts can deter entry, then it is profitable for the incumbent to do so. The equations that generate these figures come from the proof of Proposition 3. Figure 1 , which assumes c = 0, examines the case where the market is large relative to the marginal cost of production. While the minimum cross-price derivative necessary for exclusive contracts to deter entry in this example is independent of c, this is not true of the minimum crosselasticity. With linear demand, the cross-elasticity is larger for any given cross-price derivative the smaller are total sales. So, not surprisingly, when the market size is smaller, c is larger, the minimum cross-elasticity is greater, as figure 2 shows.
Even in this case, however, if there are even a handful of downstream competitors, the crosselasticity does not need to be that large for the incumbent firm to be able to use exclusive contracts to inefficiently deter entry. 
Appendix

Proof of Proposition 3
Demand is given by:
Here, P i represents the price that downstream firm i charges to final consumers (as opposed to p i which is its input price). Because we assume that the only cost downstream firms bear is their input cost, their profit function is:
The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium to the downstream pricing game is the following:
In this equation, p T = P N j=1 p j . Using (2) and (4), one can find the demand function for I from only those buyer's subject to an exclusive contract (captive buyers) as a function of the number of captive buyers and the input price, p s , it charges captive buyers. We call the total amount of demand by the n captive buyers,
Thus, for any given n, I's profits from captive buyers in period 3.3 are given by:
In setting p s (its price to captive buyers in period 3.1), I has two considerations. The price it chooses both affects the number of buyers who breach in period 3.2 and caps the price that it can charge captive buyers in period 3.3. We define p s,1 as the price that deters buyers from breaching in period 3.2 and p s,3 as the price that maximizes I's profit from captive buyers in period 3.3.
First, we determine p s,1 , the highest price I can charge in period 3.1 that will deter a buyer from breaching, given that n other buyers remain captive and given that I will not reduce this price in period 3.3. p s,1 is the solution to the following equation:
Recall that π b (p s,1 , (p n s,1 , c N−n−1 )) is a buyer's profit when it pays an input price of p s,1 , n other buyers also pay this input price and the remaining N − n − 1 buyers pay c. So the first term is a buyer's profit from not breaching when n other buyers remain captive. The second term, in curly braces, is the buyer's profit from breaching. The first part of the second term is her profit buying the good at c when n other buyers are captive. The part, the term in square brackets, is the expectation damages she must pay for breach, I's profit when n + 1 buyers are captive minus its profit when only n buyers remain captive.
Using (2) and (4), we can get explicit formulas for π b and q as a function of p s,1 and n. Using these, we solve (7) for p s,1 :
Now, we solve for the optimal p s, 3 . Solving I's first order condition for profit maximization, we find that the optimal price that I charges to captive buyers is:
Notice that if p s,3 < p s,1 , then I will set p s = p s,3 . When p s,1 < p s,3 , I's profits are clearly increasing in p s,1 for any given n. Furthermore, p s,1 is increasing in n. Thus, if it is profitable for I to set p s,1 to deter n buyers from breaching, it is profitable for I to set p s,1 to deter all N buyers from breaching (assuming they have all signed exclusives in period 1). 28
Now that we have shown that I can more profitably deter breach from a greater number of buyers than a lesser number of buyers, we turn to the case where p s,1 > p s,3 (the binding price is the price set to maximize period 3.3 profits). We can use (4) and p s,3 to find the equilibrium downstream prices as a function of the number of captive buyers (since free buyers pay c). This, in turn, allows us to compute equilibrium profits for the incumbent, captive buyers, and free buyers only as a function of n, the number of captive buyers, and z, the degree of product differentiation 
Using these profit functions in condition (1), we find that signing n buyers to an exclusive contract is breach proof given entry if and only if: 
One can easily show that n * 1 > N. If we evaluate the derivative of the term in curly braces at n = n * 2 , we get: 
It is easy to verify that this is increasing in z. When I chooses p s,1 < p s, 3 , it can charge a higher price and make more profits the larger z is. This means that if it will be profitable to choose p s,1
to deter breach for some z 0 , then it will be profitable to do so for all z > z 0 .
Now, consider the case where p s,1 > p s,3 . When n = N , the curly braces term from (13) becomes:
(zN + 1) (2 + zN − z) 
